Scotland headed towards "Independence-Lite"? by McGlinchey, Stephen & Cole, Phillip
!  
September 23, 2014 
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"The only certainty is that we do not know what the future holds for the UK, 
except that there will be radical changes in its relationship with Scotland, with 
unknown consequences for the country’s future."  !
Professor Phillip Cole & Dr Stephen McGlinchey  !
It was a simple question with two simple answers: Should Scotland be an 
independent country? The answer was either “yes” or “no.” But behind both 
of these answers lay an extraordinarily complex future for the United 
Kingdom. But strangely, that future, however complex, may have been very 
similar no matter what answer was given by the majority of the votes. 
In the end, the answer was “no.” With 55 percent of the final vote on the 
night, the “No” camp came out with a much higher majority than the polls 
had expected. This presented an unexpected blow to the Scottish 
independence movement and has probably removed the issue from the 
political landscape in Britain for decades to come. It also claimed the scalp 
of the Scottish First Minister, Alex Salmond, who resigned shortly after 
defeat. 
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Devolution or Revolution? 
What is more certain is that the UK government knows it has to look at 
radical constitutional reform. It has to implement the “devo max” option. 
This is the option for more extensive devolved powers for the Scottish 
government, and it was put on the table by the “No” campaign in the last 
weeks before the referendum in order to shore up what appeared to be a 
wavering “No” vote. The fact is, however, that the devo max option has 
always been on the table—it was just that the “No” campaign decided not to 
play that card until very late in the day. 
Originally it was the Scottish government that wanted a three-question 
ballot paper—“Yes” or “No” or devo max. It was the UK government that 
wanted the two-question Yes/No ballot and the Scottish nationalists came 
around to its way of thinking. This started to look like a gamble that had 
backfired in the last weeks of the campaign, but in the end the Westminster 
parties got the result they all wanted. 
But although devo max was never offered to the voters, that seems to be the 
road the UK will now take, and the end result is likely to be a Scotland with 
far greater powers over its own affairs, a federated state with the rest of the 
UK—maybe a better way to describe it would be independence-lite. 
A Climate of Uncertainty 
The implications for the rest of the UK are enormous, should Northern 
Ireland and Wales gain a similar status, and England’s regions joining in too 
in a coherent federal state with a UK government in Westminster and 
powerful regional governments in Edinburgh, Belfast, Scotland and in the 
English regions. But given the muddled nature of British constitutional 
politics, the most likely result would have been a powerful Scotland, 
federated with the rest of the UK, and much weaker governments in Wales 
and Northern Ireland and nothing for England. However, late in the 
campaign, the “No” camp began to raise such slogans as “English votes for 
English laws” and the idea of enhanced national and regional power 
transfers was touted. 
The Westminster parties have agreed upon a schedule for reform in relation 
to Scotland—agreement on the package for devo max by November 30, a 
fully published outline by January ready for the British General Election 
next May. But we now know that all three parties have profound 
disagreements about what the reform should look like. The Liberal 
Democrats want to see a modern federal constitution for Scotland, Wales 
and Ireland, and some form of devolved powers for England focused in 
regions and cities. Prime Minister David Cameron’s Conservative Party has 
hitched Scottish reform with the West Lothian question, such that Scottish 
MPs at Westminster will lose any say over England-only matters. The 
  	  2
Labour Party—currently in opposition but polling ahead for 2015—want the 
Scottish reforms to go ahead with a delay on the wider constitutional 
question for the UK. 
What this now looks like is a dirty inter-party battle seeking to protect 
vested political interests, rather than a rational process of reform, as 
Scotland, and perhaps the rest of the UK, looks on with eyebrows raised. 
This is especially evident for Labour, who draw a much larger quota of their 
Members of Parliament from Scotland than the other two parties. Labour 
also draws heavily on its Welsh MPs. Should they lose those votes in 
Westminster during “English-only” votes, they may find themselves 
permanently unable to govern in certain situations, even if they win a 
General Election. 
It is interesting to think what might have happened to the UK if the “Yes” 
campaign had won a narrow victory. The fact is this would not have 
triggered a smooth, well-worked-out transition to independence. We would 
have entered the political unknown; it is not even clear who would have 
taken part in the negotiations. Although the leaders of both campaigns drew 
their lines in the sand—over currency, EU membership and nuclear 
weapons, for example—this was always hot air. Everything would have 
been up for negotiation and nobody was in a position to state categorically 
what the outcome of those negotiations would have been, except the end 
result of Scottish independence. 
Even Alex Salmond’s date for independence, March 2016, was his own 
aspiration, not an agreed cut-off date for negotiations. Why March 2016? On 
the one hand, eighteen months may have seemed a reasonable time scale for 
independence. But on the other hand, and perhaps more significantly, 
elections to the Scottish parliament are due in May 2016. With UK elections 
in May 2015, if negotiations had not been completed as quickly as Salmond 
wanted there was no guarantee that either party that started those 
negotiations would be in power to conclude them. This is something that 
typifies British politics, and especially British constitutional matters, in 
general. 
What if those new negotiators were opposed to independence, and 
negotiated a different outcome—probably something like devo max? They 
could put that to another referendum to finally settle the question, and given 
the popularity of the devo max option in the polls, it may well have come 
through. Anthony Hilton, writing in The Independent on polling day, argued 
that this was still a possibility even without changes in government. The 
most likely outcome would be two options, full independence or devo max, 
and the UK government would have had the power to call a second 
referendum to settle the question, again with devo max being the most likely 
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  3
And so we could have arrived at much the same place whatever the 
outcome, with a highly devolved Scotland enjoying independence-lite, and 
the rest of the UK making do with something more or less like what it has 
now. Or, more optimistically, a coherent federal UK with a modern 
constitution. 
Defense 
The entire independence debate also raised issues about defense and 
security. The UK is a major force in NATO, and in the operations in the 
Middle East that began in 2001 and continue today with the war on the 
Islamic State. With the “Yes” camp professing a non-nuclear, and generally 
revisionist, stance on defense—the vitality and endurance of one of the 
world’s premier military powers was called into question. With Wales and 
Northern Ireland significantly poorer than England, and sharing a tendency 
for higher social spending in their regional politics, we may be looking at a 
steep reduction in the military budget of the UK in the years to come as 
newly devolved powers allow the regions to shape their own taxation and 
spending. 
So, although the “No” camp triumphed, the debate on defense has not yet 
even really begun. This also goes beyond the issue of mere military 
spending, but to constitutional arrangements. If England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland receive a significant increase in devolved powers, then 
Westminster may no longer hold sway over much in British politics beyond 
national security and high economics. The British Cabinet as we know it 
may come to resemble something akin to a National Security Council. 
Europe 
One would presume that if Scotland had left the UK, it would have 
submitted an application to join the European Union—if at the very least to 
secure a currency to replace the pound. While such a process is now out of 
the question, there is a certain irony in play for the Scottish people. If 
Scotland had successfully seceded, then the Scottish would have their EU 
membership in their own hands. With the victory of the “No” campaign, 
Scotland’s EU-future now lies in the hands of a British “In/Out” referendum 
on EU membership that is likely to follow the 2015 general election. 
All this is guesswork of course, and the old cliché applies here, that the only 
certainty is that we do not know what the future holds for the UK, except 
that there will be radical changes in its relationship with Scotland, with 
unknown consequences for the country’s future. There may also be 
significant changes in how the UK acts internationally as the coherency of 
the Union is tested in both home and foreign affairs in the years ahead.
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